When senior Canadian officials traveled quietly to Sweden this year to meet executives at Saab, the visit attracted little public notice. But the discussions underway — centered on the possibility of assembling Saab’s Gripen E fighter jet in Canada in partnership with Bombardier — represent one of the most consequential defense deliberations in decades. If realized, the arrangement would mark a dramatic shift in Canada’s aerospace posture, reviving domestic fighter jet production more than 60 years after the cancellation of the Avro Arrow and recalibrating Ottawa’s reliance on American defense suppliers.
The talks unfold at a moment of strain in Canada’s relationship with President Donald Trump’s administration, which has revived tariffs and sharpened rhetoric toward traditional allies. While Canadian officials have not publicly framed the Saab discussions as a response to Washington, people familiar with internal reviews say concerns about cost overruns and strategic dependence in the U.S.-led F-35 program have intensified scrutiny in Ottawa. Prime Minister Mark Carney ordered a reassessment of Canada’s 88-aircraft F-35 commitment earlier this year, citing rising lifecycle expenses and delivery uncertainty.
Saab’s Gripen E, by contrast, has been presented by its backers as a lower-cost, more flexible platform suited to Canada’s Arctic environment. Designed to operate from short runways and to require relatively modest maintenance infrastructure, the aircraft appeals to planners seeking greater autonomy in northern patrol missions. Industry analysts note that a mixed fleet — retaining some F-35s for NATO interoperability while deploying Gripens for domestic sovereignty tasks — would diversify operational risk.
The industrial dimension may be even more significant. Canada has not built a fighter jet since the Arrow program was scrapped in 1959, a decision that scattered engineers and redirected aerospace talent abroad. A domestic assembly line, potentially anchored by Bombardier’s manufacturing expertise, could generate thousands of skilled jobs and reconstitute supply chains spanning avionics, composites and propulsion systems. Provincial governments in Ontario and Quebec are reportedly preparing competing incentive packages, according to officials briefed on early-stage proposals.
Yet the project faces formidable obstacles. Bombardier’s history in commercial aviation includes ambitious programs that strained finances, and transitioning to military production entails heightened security protocols and certification standards. “It is not simply a matter of adapting a factory,” said one defense procurement specialist. “You are building an ecosystem with strict export controls, classified components and multi-decade sustainment commitments.”
Those export controls introduce a geopolitical complication. The Gripen E relies on an American-made GE F414 engine, meaning U.S. approval would be required for any Canadian manufacturing or re-export. Under American law, Washington retains authority to block transfers of military equipment containing U.S. components. With cross-border trade tensions lingering, some Canadian policymakers privately acknowledge that such leverage cannot be ignored.
Saab’s motivation extends beyond Canada. The company faces surging demand after Ukraine signaled interest in acquiring between 100 and 150 Gripen aircraft, a volume that would exceed Sweden’s current production capacity. Partnering with a country possessing advanced aerospace infrastructure would accelerate output while embedding the jet within NATO markets. Canada, as a G7 member with established defense procurement frameworks, offers both credibility and industrial depth.
Within the Canadian Armed Forces, technical assessments are underway regarding integration of a potential mixed fleet, according to defense officials who requested anonymity to discuss internal planning. Bases in the Arctic would require infrastructure upgrades, and training pipelines would need revision. While no final decision has been announced, such preparatory work suggests that the option is being treated as viable rather than hypothetical.
In Washington, reaction has been muted but attentive. American defense contractors have long viewed Canada as a stable participant in joint production networks centered on the F-35. A shift toward Swedish collaboration would not sever those ties, but it could redistribute influence in procurement negotiations. U.S. officials emphasize that interoperability remains paramount within NATO, and they have not publicly opposed Canada’s exploration of alternatives.
For Canada, the deliberation transcends a single aircraft choice. It touches on enduring questions of sovereignty, industrial capacity and vulnerability in a volatile geopolitical climate. Reviving fighter production would require sustained political consensus, billions in public support and careful navigation of alliance dynamics. Whether Ottawa ultimately proceeds with Saab or reaffirms its commitment to the F-35, the episode reflects a broader rethinking of dependence in an era when economic and security relationships are increasingly transactional.
The path ahead remains uncertain. Financing structures must be clarified, export permissions negotiated and public opinion weighed. Yet the mere plausibility of a Canadian-built fighter jet marks a departure from decades of assumption. In reassessing how it equips and defends itself, Canada is not only evaluating hardware; it is reconsidering the balance between integration and autonomy. The outcome will shape not just procurement budgets, but the strategic architecture of North American defense for years to come.
